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TThe primary goal of monetary policy is to react to changes in the economic environment, as was the case during the period of pragmatic monetarism between 1979 and 1982, aimed at curbing the previous decade’s inflation, or 
the prevailing price stability of the 1990’s. 
Obviously, the latter may be accompanied 
by secondary goals (such as the growth and 
employment goals of taylor’s rule) or may 
even be reversed, as in the case of Japan’s 
quantitative and qualitative easing, aimed 
at replacing deflation by price stability. 
Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system and the emerging markets’ crises of 
the nineties, the exchange rate as a goal has 
been struck off the global agenda and price 
stability appears as a valid demand also in 
member states contemplating to introduce the 
euro (as esCB members). Financial stability, 
as a less than primary goal, continuously 
appears in legal regulations, while Benati et 
al. (2011) remark that although it is clearly 
necessary, it is difficult to put into practice. 
today, there are two approaches regarding 
the operationalisation of this problem: one 
is the institutional approach – to transfer 
supervisory competencies to the central bank 
(MNB, 2013; Borio, 2014) or delegate them 
to community level (szegedi, 2012) – and the 
other is to expand the tool-set, resulting in 
the extensive management of the yield curve 
– and not only in home currency. 
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Over the course of the past five years, the 
transformation of central bank competencies 
was accompanied by the expansion of mon-
etary instruments: compared to long-term 
or collateralised loan programmes used by 
the eCB, the asset purchase programmes of 
the Bank of Japan (BoJ) were much more ag-
gressive, in addition to company securities 
(bonds, bills), they also include securities is-
sued by property developers, and investment 
units traded on the stock market. Provision of 
foreign currency liquidity has also been con-
stantly on the agenda since the end of 2007: 
leading central banks continue to do usd-
currency swaps to this day, which indicates 
serious market allocation problems in the age 
of convertible currencies. 
in Central and eastern europe, convert-
ibility, floating currencies and price stability 
‒ as goals ‒ meet with the demand for foreign 
liquidity (Kovács, 2009; Árvai et al., 2009), 
arising from the issue of underdeveloped mon-
ey markets (Farkas, 2011). Among Cee coun-
tries, Hungary and Poland are characterised 
by the demand for foreign liquidity, caused 
by the loan-to-deposit ratios exceeding 100% 
(eBF, 2012), while a large proportion of loans 
was provided in foreign currency (Yesin, 2013) 
– the Czech currency, therefore, is a good basis 
for comparison, because the loan-to-deposit 
ratio was under 100% there and foreign cur-
rency loans were not as widespread. Consid-
ering that currency pricing uncertainties are 
related to a country’s total debt, the Czech and 
Hungarian examples seem to be suitable for 
comparison on the liberalised capital market 
of Central and eastern europe. This compari-
son seems even more viable when we look at 
the statement by Hudecz (2012), according to 
which the similar household debts of the two 
countries (with different levels of sovereign 
and corporate borrowing) were coupled with 
completely different foreign currency expo-
sure in 2008: while in Hungary it was close to 
70 per cent, in the Czech Republic the ratio of 
FX loans was negligible.
This article aims to examine the currencies 
(swiss franc – CHF, euro – euR, Japanese 
yen – JPY) of Hungarian FX loans, using the 
methodology of applying the same tests for the 
Czech koruna (CZK) as the control currency. 
We conducted our tests by using the average 
overnight exchange rates between 1 January 
2002 and 31 december 2013 (N=3035), us-
ing the database of the Central Bank of Po-
land2as the source. Our aim was to find out 
whether there had been changes in the rela-
tionship of HuF and other key currencies 
(meaning the distribution of extreme daily 
appreciation and weakening and the periods 
of comovement), compared to the pre-crisis 
period. We compared the various periods by 
dividing the total sample into four stages, dif-
ferentiating the following periods: monetary 
tightening (between 1 May 2005 and 31 July 
2007), subprime (between 1 August 2007 and 
31 January 2010), interim (between 1 Feb-
ruary 2010 and 30 November 2011) and re-
sponses to the euro crisis (between 1 decem-
ber 2011 and 31 december 2013). 
exchange risk, arising during foreign cur-
rency lending, may have two reasons: changes 
in the currency of disbursement (in our case 
HuF) or the currency of funding (e.g. CHF, 
euR, JPY). if masses of extreme fluctuations 
are only detected in one source currency, it 
may be advisable to manage that particular 
foreign currency exposure with a targeted ap-
proach (e.g. swap transactions between the 
eCB and the Bank of england on 17 de-
cember 2010 to manage the GBP liquidity of 
irish banks3). On the other hand, if similar 
problems are detected in all source curren-
cies, it is advisable to consider comprehensive 
consolidation measures (see e.g. Berlinger ‒ 
Walter, 2013). in the case of a regional issue 
(the above-mentioned problems of several po-
tential currencies of disbursement), decision-
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makers should consider a community-level 
programme (such as the eCB‒iMF‒WB-pro-
grammes implemented at the end of autumn 
2008 or the currency swaps after 2007). Apart 
from exchange risks, the difficulty of man-
aging foreign currency lending stems from 
the fact that low interest rates mean low en-
try barriers at the time of allocation already, 
therefore, the structure of the asset portfolio is 
more heterogeneous, than in the case of HuF 
loans. Asset side problems cannot be managed 
with market solutions only.
MonETAry poLiCy MEASurES 
in this chapter, we first present arguments 
for connecting monetary policy and macro-
prudential supervision, review the primary 
goals of central banks issuing key currencies, 
then examine which measures should be 
analysed from an exchange rate aspect. Finally, 
by reviewing certain central bank measures, 
we define the time windows which can be 
used to specify pre- and post-crisis periods. 
in this section, we provide a brief overview 
of factors that render it more difficult to in-
clude financial stability among the monetary 
policy goals, however, according to Benati 
and Goodhart (2011,) necessitate the transfer 
of macro-prudential supervision to the central 
bank. Just to remind the reader: in Western 
europe before the crisis, the separation of 
monetary policy and financial supervision was 
emphasised so that supervising the institu-
tional system would not hinder central banks 
in achieving their main goals (Bánfi et al., 
2011). The timbergen principle can also be 
mentioned as the most basic counterargument 
against setting financial stability as a goal, 
which states that for each policy objective, a 
certain policy instrument should be assigned 
(e.g. using policy interest rates in the case of 
inflation targets). Bursting asset price bubbles 
did not seem avoidable even before the cri-
sis; according to the Greenspan doctrine, it is 
cheaper to manage burst asset price bubbles 
subsequently with monetary policy measures, 
rather than go against the flow of market pro-
cesses by using anti-cyclical policies. it should 
be emphasised, however, that in the european 
Harmonised Consumer Price index (HCPi), 
both energy and property market price compo-
nents are allocated a 10 per cent weight (eCB, 
2011). shocks on the asset side of banks have 
already been considered in monetary policies 
to a certain degree even before the crisis, al-
though we have to agree with the paper by 
Kolozsi (2013), which stressed that the “one 
objective-one policy” approach had become 
outdated. The logic of Basel ii regulations ap-
proaches the problem of managing the liabil-
ity side of commercial banks in a way that “a 
solvent bank will always have access to liquidi-
ty on the market” (Benati ‒ Goodhart, 2011). 
Lessons learnt from the crisis show that this 
automatism does not work: the Bis (2011) 
stresses the importance of central banks and 
international financial organisations in creat-
ing liquidity – which is a logical argument in 
favour of assigning supervisory competencies 
to central banks, due to the option of targeted 
measures. From an institutional aspect, it was 
pointed out by Lawson and Zimková (2009), 
as well as the National Bank of Hungary 
(2013), that as universal banking services were 
followed by the integration of financial super-
vision (Hungary: 1999, Poland: 2006), the 
lessons learnt from the “international life and 
national death” of the banking sector might 
require the combined supervision of liquid-
ity and solvency, perhaps even complemented 
with the banking union, described by Darvas 
(2013), on a community level, however, based 
on Pelle (2006), it would be necessary to har-
monise and integrate supervisory functions at 
least. Assuming that such a community-level 
solution is able to manage the access to liquid-
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ity of banking networks in the Cee region. 
Regarding our sample, we must note that in 
the Czech Republic, banking supervision has 
been assigned to the central bank since 1993, 
followed by granting capital market and in-
surance supervisory competencies later. 4 
in our view, this summary is necessary, be-
cause we intend to proceed by describing the 
unique evolution of the management of FX 
liquidity by central banks.
According to Paragraph (1) of Article 127 
of the treaty on the Functioning of the eu-
ropean union, the primary objective of the 
european Central Bank shall be to maintain 
price stability. Without prejudice to the objec-
tive of price stability, the eCB can support the 
objectives of full employment and balanced 
growth. According to 5 Paragraph (1) of Ar-
ticle 5 of Federal Act no. 951.11 on the swiss 
National Bank (3 October 2003), the primary 
objective of the sNB is to ensure price stabil-
ity. Article 2 of6 the Bank of Japan Act (Act 
No. 89 of June 18, 1997) also prescribes price 
stability as an objective, however, the BoJ’s 
decision on quantitative and qualitative mon-
etary easing (4 April 2013) also introduces the 
rather aggressive expansion of the monetary 
base (an annual 60-70 JPY expansion of the 
138 billion JPY base at the end of 2012), with 
the aim to increase the price level to 2 per cent 
within two years.7
The independence of central banks in the 
territory of the eu means the national and 
community level institutional independ-
ence of monetary policies (Article 130 of the 
treaty on the Functioning of the european 
union), similarly to switzerland (Article 6 of 
the aforementioned Federal Act and Article 
99 of the Constitution of the swiss Confed-
eration). On the other hand, Article 4 of the 
Bank of Japan Act talks about maintaining 
close contact with the government, as well as 
the mutual compatibility of monetary, cur-
rency and economic policies. The autonomy 
of monetary policy, however, means that the 
central bank has room to manoeuvre in the 
capital market: we can talk about autonomous 
monetary policy if central bank measures are 
driven by the desire to reach the primary goal8 
(Bearce, 2002b). This may be curbed by the 
monetary policy of central banks that issue 
key currencies, the openness of the balance of 
payments (Plümper ‒ troeger, 2008) and the 
pro-cyclicality of the financial system, due to 
global liquidity flows (Bis, 2011). small open 
economies may try to declare the independ-
ent floating of currencies (explicitly remov-
ing this from monetary policy goals), but this 
will affect medium-term price levels through 
the exchange rate channel of the transmission 
mechanism. Furthermore, due to the external 
funding of the economy (generally, the use of 
external funds in the case of an over 100 per 
cent loan-to-deposit ratio and specifically for-
eign currency lending) it will even dominate 
the channels of interests and expectations by 
influencing consumption and investment de-
cisions. 
in this chapter, we apply the previously 
outlined arguments to discuss the decisions of 
central banks that issue the key currencies of 
foreign currency loans. Our work is rendered 
much more difficult by the fact that Kiss and 
Kosztopulosz (2013) used the progression of 
eCB policy interest rates to determine pre-
crisis (between december 2005 and October 
2008) and crisis (between October 2008 and 
July 2011) periods. during the crisis manage-
ment period, leading central banks eventually 
reached the zero lower bound rate, therefore, 
they had to introduce further measures, as 
mentioned in our introduction. As the pre-
sent paper focuses on the currency market, 
instead of discussing attempts to reinvigor-
ate the securities market [which is exam-
ined by Győrfi (2013) in detail], we choose 
to analyse currency swaps. On 12 december 
2007, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of eng-
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land, the swiss National Bank, the eCB and 
the Fed have announced the first temporary 
usd swap agreement9 (with the Bank of Ja-
pan joining later, on 18 september 200810), 
which, apart from a break between February 
and May 2010, was continuously extended 
until 31 October 201311, from which date 
the existing temporary liquidity swap ar-
rangements were converted to standing ar-
rangements between these 6 leading central 
banks. This programme was complemented 
with a bilateral swap agreement, introduced 
on 30 November 2011,12 allowing the above 
central banks to authorise swap arrangements 
to provide liquidity in any of their curren-
cies. in addition to the above measures, on 15 
October 2008, euR/CHF foreign exchange 
swaps were launched between the eurosystem 
and the swiss National Bank, which are being 
extended to this day13, and on 17 december 
2010 a temporary GBP/euR14 liquidity swap 
facility was launched. in October and No-
vember 2008, the eCB announced swap and 
repurchase agreements with the central banks 
of Hungary15, denmark16 and Poland17. An 
actual exchange rate policy measure was taken 
by the swiss National Bank only, when on 6 
september 2011 it decided to stop the further 
appreciation of the swiss franc by introducing 
a minimum euR/CHF exchange rate of CHF 
1.20 (sNB, 2012). All central banks involved 
applied a floating exchange rate policy.18 
using the changes in the policy interest 
rate and the dates of the swap agreements, we 
compare the following periods (see Chart 1): 
•	monetary tightening (rising interest rates, 
period between 1 May 2005 and 31 July 
2007, N=610), 
•	subprime (falling interest rates and the 
first round of the swap agreements, period 
between 1 August 2007 and 31 January 
2010, N=633), 
Chart 1
Main central bank swap transactions in the various phases of the crisis
Source: own calculations
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•	interim (more swap agreements, sovereign 
crisis and the introduction of the CHF 
exchange rate ceiling, period between 1 
February 2010 and 30 November 2011, 
N=467) 
•	and the responses to the euro crisis 
(introduction of the bilateral swap 
agreement, period between 1 december 
2011 and 31 december 2013, N=522).
METHodoLoGy 
in the course of our paper, we examine the 
extreme movement of Central and eastern euro-
pean currencies (Czech koruna and Hungarian 
forint) against the leading currencies (euro, 
swiss franc and yen), its timing and changes 
in their comovement during the period defined 
in the previous chapter. For this, we first need 
to define extreme movements and the three 
methods of their measurement, as well as the 
methodology of calculating correlations, relying 
on our previous work (Kiss – Kosztopulosz, 
2012) for the latter.
international finance often reaches for 
the definition of sudden cessation of liquid-
ity flow if they experience an unexpected de-
crease in the inflow of foreign capital greater 
than two standard deviations (Frankel 2011). 
The present study groups the currencies’ fluc-
tuations (or “returns”, which we determine as 
logarithmic differentials of the currency rate) 
into two complimentary sets: extreme and 
normal movements. in our paper, we refer to 
those sets of returns as rn normal return (1) 
which have a higher than 5 per cent probabil-
ity of fitting well to the normal distribution 
– using Fama’s (1970) expected normal distri-
bution hypothesis from pages 384 and 399 of 








Assuming that the returns of the currency 
markets included in our sample can take rn 
normal and rx extreme values, we are talking 
about capital market shock which we denote 
with rn/x. in the case of rnmi/x=0 (2), we can not 
talk about the existence of shock because of 
the lack of extreme returns, while in the case 
of rnmi/x≠0 (3) we can. 
r mi =0 → rmi= r mi (2)n/x n
r mi ≠0 → rmi={ r mi (3)nn/x r mix
For a deeper formulation of extreme move-
ment, we use the definition of extreme events 
by Jentsch et al. (2006) whereby among the 
W stochastic variables (in our case currency 
movements) such wxW extreme events occur, 
which we can characterise as having wx+>>wn 
or wx-<<wn a great effect, or p(wx)<<p(wn) low 
probability. This is, in large part, similar to the 
extreme value concept of Jiawei and Micheline 
(2004), in which they speak of data elements 
which drastically diverge from the other com-
ponents of the data set. The determination of 
this requires an organising principle which 
identifies data set inconsistency. in the course 
of our statistical approach, we focus on the 
contradictions between the sample’s theoreti-
cal and empirical distribution, while during 
distance-based procedures, we reveal the out-
lier elements with the help of cluster analysis. 
On the basis of all this, in the rR exchange 
rate changes data set, we distinguish between 
the rx extreme returns’ set, in which the prob-
ability of p(rx)<<p(rn) is extremely low and the 
rx+>>rn or rx-<<rn level of movement signifi-
cant. in the detection of extreme returns we 
used three methods, built on a reduction of: 
in the first approach the movement’s low (less 
than 5 per cent) probability, in the second its 
deviation from the normal distribution and in 
the last the fourth moment (peakedness, kur-
tosis) to 3 – the capital market returns’ power 
distribution assumption (in its simplest form 
 studies 
Public Finance Quarterly  2014/2 193
r=ka) by Gabaix et al. (2003) being important 
for us. 
We call extreme returns with a probability of 
less than 5 per cent rvx improbable returns (4). 
Their presence is allowed by the assumption of 
normal distribution but in much lower volume 
than is the case for fat-tailed distribution.
p(rvx)<5 per cent and rvx-<<rn<<rvx+ (4)
This solution, following the logic of the 
Value-at-Risk method, matches the time se-
ries with a theoretical normal distribution and 
places those movements with a probability of 
less than 5 per cent in the improbable returns’ 
set. Consequently the method places, on both 
sides, the same number (3,0350.05=151 
or 152) of elements in the extreme set – be-
ing, in total, indifferent to any asymmetry in 
the extreme movements (for example a given 
currency experiencing many extreme devalu-
ations in the past followed by fewer apprecia-
tions).
The existence of rfx fat-tailed returns is a re-
sult of the empirical fat-tailed distribution of 
returns, while, as a function of the asymmetry 
of the probability distribution, they appear to 
differing degrees on both sides of the prob-
ability distribution, their number and prob-
ability, however, diverging to a large extent 
from the e (r) expected value. For this, we use 
their QQ plot “s” shaped distribution, after 
Clauset (2007), and in the spirit of Jiawei and 
Micheline (2004) make a statistical estimate 
based on the assumed normal truncated dis-
tribution. 
rfx+E(r), or E(r) rfx –; where prfx pE(r) (5)
For the presentation of the logic of the 
Quantile-Quantile plot, we rely on pages 690-
691 of Deutsch’s book (2002).
using the QQ plot, we can select extreme 
returns as follows (6):
Xi= 1
–1(pi )=1




where Xi matches the theoretical standard normal 
distribution, which is a  sloped straight line.
The rox outlier returns (9) are members of a 
cluster with a small number of elements, and 
are responsible for all  of the sample’s high 
(above 3) kurtosis. We can arrive at the outlier 
returns through the systematic segmentation 
of the sample, whereby we cluster the total 
population until the largest cluster’s fourth 
moment equals 3.
rox𝕆 and d =𝕆 where Ed [(r–μ)4]3  
and e[(rn–μ)4]≈3  (7)
in formula (9), d  denotes the total sample, 
𝕆 denotes the rox outlier returns’ set, while  
the normal returns’ set. during the examination, 
we divided the sample, using hierarchical cluster 
analysis, into clusters from 1 to 200 and then 
searched for the clustering procedure which re-
sulted in the least number of clusters, where the 
biggest cluster’s kurtosis had a value of less than 
3. using the wide intervals for the number of 
clusters was justified by our experience that the 
formation of 73 and 134 clusters was necessary 
for the largest cluster’s kurtosis to be below 3. 
using the so-called system-embedded na-
ture of the extreme returns (that is, after 
Kantz et al. (2006) we assume that a system’s 
tendency to excess depends on this structure), 
it is more favourable to examine the currency 
markets than the scale-free networks with a 
tendency to leave their state of equilibrium, 
as described by Barabási and Albert (1998).20 
We can distinguish between two kinds of col-
lective behaviours: contagion and divergence, 
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while in the absence of the above, we can 
speak of interdependence. 
Capital market contagion21 (8) means a sig-
nificant increase in the correlation between 
markets mk , mj pmkmj as a result of a shock 
rn/x (Forbes ‒ Rigobon, 2002; Campbell et al., 
2002; Bekaert et al., 2005):
r mi ≠0 →pmkmj <pmkmj , (8)n/x n x
accordingly, in so far as trading days in the mi 
market can be divided into normal and extreme 
return sets on the basis of the defined rn/x shock, 
we then divide the pmkmj correlation between 
the mk , mj markets into two parts and observe 
a significantly higher correlation in the period 
characterised by the shock.
Capital market divergence (9) is defined as a 
significant decrease in the correlation between 
the markets mkmj pmkmj as a result of external 
or internal shock rn/x (Bearce, 2002a):
r mi ≠0 →pmkmj <pmkmj , (9)n/x n x
accordingly, in so far as trading days in the mi 
market can be divided into normal and extreme 
return sets on the basis of the defined rn/x shock, 
we then divide the pmkmj correlation between 
the mk , mj markets into two parts and observe 
a significantly lower correlation in the period 
characterised by the shock.
We can speak of Capital market interde-
pendence (10) in the case of no significant 
change in the correlation between mkmj mar-
kets pmkmj following an external or internal 
shock rn/x (Forbes ‒ Rigobon, 2002): 
r mi ≠0 →pmkmj ≈pmkmj (10)n/x n x
accordingly, in so far as trading days in the mi 
market can be divided into normal and extreme 
return sets on the basis of the defined rn/x shock, 
we then divide the pmkmj correlation between 
the mk , mj markets into two parts and do not 
observe a significantly higher correlation in 
the period characterised by the shock. it is 
important to note that in the present paper, 
contrary to Kiss – Kosztopulosz (2012), we 
do not examine the changed conditional 
correlation on trading days characterised by 
extreme movements, but are interested in the 
changing correlations in the various phases 
of the crisis. Based on the article by Capriello, 
Engle and Sheppard (2006), for the calculation of 
conditional correlations, we first used univariate 
APARCH‒GRJ GARCH‒tARCH‒GARCH 
models, with various lags, matched to examine 
the time series’ heteroscedasticity, and then, after 
calculating engle’s (2002) dynamic Conditional 
Correlation (dCC GARCH), we used the 
Ansari‒Bradley- (A‒B-) test22 to examine the 
significance of deviations between individual 
time windows. This was necessary because of the 
A-B test’s insensitivity to distribution. 
rESuLTS 
The Central and eastern european currencies 
examined (Czech koruna – CZK and 
Hungarian forint – HuF) showed differing 
degrees of fluctuation against various key 
currencies (swiss franc – CHF, euro – euR 
and Japanese yen – JPY) in the period between 
January 2002 and december 2013. The 
lowest degree of fluctuation in the currencies 
examined was seen against the euro while in 
the case of the swiss franc and the Japanese 
yen, we observed more serious movements 
(see Chart 2). during the period of monetary 
tightening (“sZ” denoted period between 1 
May 2005 and 31 July 2007), both currencies 
strengthened compared to the subprime 
period (“s” denoted period between 1 Au-
gust 2007 and 31 January 2010) which was 
characterised by a general weakening. After 
this, we only observed strengthening in the 
case of the Czech koruna against the euro 
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in the interim period (“i” denoted period 
between 1 February 2010 and 30 November 
2011). in the period marked by responses 
to the euro crisis (“e”, from 1 december 
2011 to 31 december 2013), the currencies 
continued to weaken except against the yen. 
We must note, however, that in the case of the 
Czech koruna, we observe much less dramatic 
movements and cannot speak of devaluation 
at the end of the time period compared to 
January 2002 – in contrast to the forint.
in the course of our analysis of exchange 
rate changes in the total period examined (see 
Table 1), we could observe the lack of normal 
distribution, volatility clustering (heterosce-
dasticity) while the Czech koruna showed an 
inclination to autocorrelation. The third mo-
ment’s (skewness) negative value carries with 
it the mark of the weakening during the time 
of the crisis, a great mass of which is recorded 
by the Czech koruna and the forint. interest-
ingly, denomination in the swiss franc is quite 
capable of neutralising this effect. The fourth 
moment (peakedness, kurtosis) is greater than 
3in all cases, which means fat tails. it should 
be noted that low probability yet severe move-
ments are present when measuring in swiss 
francs – compared to this the Japanese yen is 
standard – despite what can be seen in Chart 2. 
The calculation in swiss francs before the 
crisis is associated with lower kurtosis than in 
the case of the euro (see Table 2). The relation-
ship between the koruna and the forint de-
veloped in a peculiar fashion – while prior to 
the crisis, the koruna’s kurtosis was less than 
half of that of the forint, over the whole time 
series, in the case of the swiss franc and the 
euro, we observed a greater kurtosis than for 
the forint. in the case of the koruna, therefore, 
we witness an increase in extreme movements 
as a result of the crisis – less characteristic in 
the case of the forint.  
if we would like to examine the tendency to 
extreme movement in more detail, in Table 3 
of the three methods presented, the fat-tailed 
and clustered returns allow the deepest exami-
nation: following the reduction of the fourth 
moment to below 3, in both cases, the forint 
exhibited a greater number of extreme trad-
ing days. Comparing with Chart 2, this means 
Table 1
the exaMined central and eastern european currencies’ logarithMic 














ljung–box (p) arch–lM (p) adf (p)
CHF
CZK 0.7750 20.4057 0* 0.9222** 0.9777*** 0****
HuF –0.0048 13.2339 0* 0.0109 0.2468*** 0****
Eur
CZK –0.3175 12.3465 0* 0.1259** 0.4409*** 0****
HuF –0.6258 11.0656 0* 0.0152 0.3109*** 0****
Jpy
CZK –0.3609 7.4581 0* 0.7879** 0.9143*** 0****
HuF –0.5120 9.1864 0* 0.0549** 0.4361*** 0****
Note: *: absence of normal distribution, **: autocorrelated with 2nd lag, ***: heteroscedasticity with 2nd lag, ****: stationary
Source: own calculations
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that, in contrast with the symmetrical nature 
of the Czech koruna’s extreme movements, in 
case of the forint, days of extreme weakening 
are dominant. This picture is reinforced by 
the wider intervals set for the forint (that is 
to say that this currency has to undergo much 
greater movements to be considered extreme 
whichever method is used). The success of the 
definition of extreme movement is indicated 
by the fact that the returns thus defined char-
acteristically make up 10 per cent of the total 
sample (5 per cent on each side) which is re-
ally a sign of unusualness. An exception to this 
is the forint measured against the swiss franc 
and the euro where, to arrive at a kurtosis of 
3 required substantial clearing of the sample.  
The time distribution of the currencies’ 
extreme movements closely follows that of 
the various periods of the crisis (see Table 4). 
Within this, extreme fluctuations are expressly 
more frequent in the subprime (“s”) period, 
where 5–6 per cent of trading days showed 
extreme jumps in the case of probability and 
cluster-based methods. A calmer market mood 
is demonstrated by the drop in the extreme 
exchange rate fluctuation against the euro and 
the Japanese yen in the interim (“i”) period 
(although it was much more subdued in the 
Chart 2
currency exchange rate developMents in the period exaMined
Source: own calculations
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Table 2
the exaMined central and eastern european currencies’ fourth MoMent in 
various periods and against various denoMinations
period denominator currency
cZk huf
Total time series CHF 20 13
Eur 12 11
Jpy 7 9





the exaMined central and eastern european currencies showed extreMe 
MoveMents with the differing Methods
denominator chf eur Jpy
currency cZk huf cZk huf cZk huf
Total kurtosis 20.4057 13.2339 12.3465 11.0656 7.4581 9.1864
improbable 
return (rvx)
kurtosis rn 2.5506 2.8554 2.5665 2.8114 2.5894 2.6949
r(x+) min 0.8846 1.2171 0.6583 0.9470 1.4348 1.6949
r(x-) max –0.9020 –1.3451 –0.6201 –1.0689 –1.5128 –1.9268
no. r(x+) 151 151 151 151 151 151
no. r(x-) 152 152 152 152 152 152
%rx 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
no. rn 2733 2733 2733 2733 2733 2733
Fat-tailed 
return (rfx)
kurtosis rn 3.1535 3.2369 2.9722 3.1395 2.8500 3.0443
r(x+) min 1.3124 1.8133 0.8154 1.4417 1.9734 2.6963
r(x-) max –1.2306 –1.5196 –0.8284 –1.1391 –1.6359 –2.0328
no. r(x+) 53 54 84 44 69 44
no. r(x-) 78 124 76 129 137 138
% rx 4% 6% 5% 6% 7% 6%
no. rn 2903 2856 2874 2861 2828 2852
Clustered 
return (rcx)
kurtosis rn 2.9894 2.9869 2.8407 2.9327 2.9584 2.9309
r(x+) min 1.0710 1.0143 0.6047 0.7982 1.6943 1.9083
r(x-) max –0.9895 –0.8809 –0.6607 –0.6619 –1.6480 –1.7050
no. r(x+) 92 213 176 208 96 107
no. r(x-) 125 310 133 341 133 192
% rx 7% 17% 10% 18% 8% 10%
no. rn 2816 2510 2723 2484 2804 2734
no. clusters 74 134 73 107 50 89
Source: own calculations
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case of the forint), compared with the swiss 
franc, where the number of extreme fluctua-
tions is similar to that in the subprime period, 
due to the start of the franc’s strengthening. 
in the period of responding to the euro cri-
sis (“e”), these fluctuations dropped in every 
case, which means that the swap agreements 
and the CHF exchange rate ceiling, intro-
duced in this period, were sufficient enough 
to calm the currency markets.  
Naturally, it is worth exploring whether the 
crisis periods, as defined by us, are really dif-
ferent from each other. As shown in Table 5, 
daily extreme movements are significantly dif-
ferent in almost all periods – apart from the 
subprime and the interim periods in the case 
of the swiss franc and the period of respond-
ing to the euro crisis in the case of the euro 
and the Japanese yen. it is an interesting find-
ing that in this case, there is no significant dif-
ference between the methods used for specify-
ing extreme returns.
The dynamic Conditional Correlation 
(dCC) shows that exchange rates in Japa-
nese yen were the closest to the results of 
Stavárek (2009), Babetskaia‒Kukharchuk et 
al. (2008), and Bubák et al. (2011), showing 
strong comovements between the uds and 
the Central and eastern european currencies 
(see Chart 3). Calculated in swiss franc, there 
were significant fluctuations in HuF-euR 
and CHF-euR comovements: these gradu-
ally decreased during the subprime crisis, 
then increased again in the interim period, 
followed by another decrease in the period 
of responding to the euro crisis. Calculated 
Table 4
tiMe distribution of the exaMined central and eastern european currencies’ 
extreMe MoveMents
 denominator chf eur Jpy
Method period cZk huf cZk huf cZk huf
rvx
SZ 8 0% 23 1% 23 1% 36 1% 7 0% 13 0%
S 120 4% 119 4% 140 5% 131 4% 138 5% 148 5%
i 107 4% 114 4% 35 1% 53 2% 66 2% 77 3%
E 26 1% 26 1% 33 1% 52 2% 59 2% 52 2%
rfx
SZ 0 0% 10 0% 8 0% 17 1% 2 0% 7 0%
S 63 2% 74 2% 82 3% 82 3% 109 4% 96 3%
i 52 2% 69 2% 18 1% 32 1% 44 1% 51 2%
E 7 0% 14 0% 18 1% 25 1% 34 1% 22 1%
rcx
SZ 4 0% 55 2% 23 1% 81 3% 2 0% 12 0%
S 92 3% 191 6% 143 5% 189 6% 116 4% 142 5%
i 78 3% 164 5% 33 1% 116 4% 50 2% 76 3%
E 15 0% 69 2% 36 1% 100 3% 43 1% 53 2%
Note:
SZ  – between 1 May 2005 and 31 July 2007, monetary tightening 
S  – between 1 August 2007 and 31 January 2010, general weakening
i  – between 1 February 2010 and 30 november 2011, interim period
E  – between 1 december 2011 and 31 december 2013, responses to the euro crisis 
Source: own calculations
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in Japanese yen, the comovement of euro-
pean currencies and the swiss franc was fairly 
strong even during the subprime crisis (0.6–
0.8), followed by the abrupt strengthening 
of the swiss franc in the interim period. it 
is noteworthy to see the correlation return-
ing to the previous range afterwards. As ex-
pected, there is no significant comovement 
between the Japanese yen and the Central 
and eastern european currencies.  
in the first two phases of the crisis, the Czech 
koruna showed a significantly increasing cor-
relation against the euro, while in the interim 
period, we see a significant reduction against the 
franc (calculated in yen) (see Table 6). There is a 
significantly inverse, although weak comove-
ment of the Japanese yen and the Czech ko-
runa (calculated in euro). in the case of the 
forint, there are fewer significant differences 
in comovement, however, the euro‒forint co-
Table 5 
significant differences in the tiMe distribution of  
the exaMined central and eastern european currencies’ extreMe MoveMents  
(applying the ansari–bradley test)
 denominator chf eur Jpy
Method period cZk huf cZk huf cZk huf
rvx
SZ–S 1 1 1 1 1 1
SZ–i 1 1 1 1 1 1
SZ–E 1 0 1 1 1 1
S–i 0 1 1 1 1 1
S–E 1 1 1 1 1 1
i–E 1 1 0 0 0 1
rfx
SZ-S 1 1 1 1 1 1
SZ–i 1 1 1 1 1 1
SZ–E 1 0 1 0 1 1
S–i 0 0 1 1 1 1
S–E 1 1 1 1 1 1
i–E 1 1 0 0 0 1
rcx
SZ-S 1 1 1 1 1 1
SZ–i 1 1 1 1 1 1
SZ–E 1 1 1 1 1 1
S–i 0 0 1 0 1 1
S–E 1 1 1 1 1 1
i–E 1 1 0 1 0 1
Note:
SZ  – between 1 May 2005 and 31 July 2007, monetary tightening 
S  – between 1 August 2007 and 31 January 2010, general weakening
i  – between 1 February 2010 and 30 november 2011, interim period
E  – between 1 december 2011 and 31 december 2013, responses to the euro crisis
Source: own calculations
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Chart 3
dynaMic conditional correlation (dcc)
Source: own calculations
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Table 6
significant differences in the dynaMic conditional correlations (dcc) between 
the exaMined periods (applying the ansari–bradley test)













SZ–S 1 1 1 1 0 1
SZ–i 1 1 1 1 1 1
SZ–E 1 1 0 1 1 1
S–i 1 1 1 1 0 1
S–E 1 1 1 1 1 1
i–E 1 0 0 1 1 1
dCC–average
SZ 0.58 0.84 –0.07 0.74 0.09 0.02
S 0.63 0.89 –0.08 0.80 –0.14 –0.10
i 0.83 0.94 –0.09 0.62 0.08 –0.15















SZ–S 1 1 1 0 1 1
SZ–i 1 0 1 1 0 1
SZ–E 0 1 0 1 1 0
S–i 1 0 0 1 1 0
S–E 1 0 1 0 0 1
i–E 1 0 1 1 1 1
dCC–average
SZ 0.53 0.76 –0.18 0.65 0.04 –0.07
S 0.64 0.86 –0.31 0.75 –0.32 –0.46
i 0.71 0.87 –0.28 0.60 –0.03 –0.45















SZ–S 1 1 0 1 0 1
SZ–i 1 0 0 1 0 1
SZ–E 1 1 1 1 1 1
S–i 1 1 1 1 1 1
S–E 0 0 0 1 1 1
i–E 1 1 1 1 1 1
dCC–average
SZ 0.62 0.45 0.77 0.13 0.25 0.90
S 0.64 0.34 0.87 –0.12 0.49 0.90
i 0.79 0.37 0.90 0.15 0.52 0.67
E 0.45 0.25 0.81 –0.06 0.35 0.94
Note:
SZ  – between 1 May 2005 and 31 July 2007, monetary tightening 
S  –between 1 August 2007 and 31 January 2010, general weakening
i  – between 1 February 2010 and 30 november 2011, interim period
E  – between 1 december 2011 and 31 december 2013, responses to the euro crisis
Source: own calculations
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movement (calculated in franc) also weakened 
recently. similarly to the koruna, there was a 
substantial reduction in the CHF-HuF co-
movement as well (although it is still signifi-
cant) in the interim period (calculated in yen). 
in the case of the Japanese yen, we see a much 
more inverse comovement. The comovement 
of the forint and the koruna was only weaker 
when calculated in euro, however, we should 
note that in the last crisis period, the corre-
lation dropped in all three calculation vari-
ants. Regarding the key currencies, we found 
an interestingly strong comovement between 
the franc and the yen, while the euro‒franc 
comovement, which could be interpreted as 
the test of our study, weakened precisely in 
the interim period (when the franc became 
stronger and the CHF exchange rate ceiling 
was introduced). 
ConCLuSionS
in summary, it can be stated that although 
it would seem logical to become indebted in 
a currency that exhibits historically strong 
comovements with our own currency and as a 
reserve currency is characterised by a low inte-
rest rate (as well as an abundance of liquidity 
and low inflation), such as the swiss franc or 
the euro, don’t do it. Weak stationarity, that 
is the stability of the first two moments, may 
still lead to the third and fourth moments 
presenting a time change, which manifests in 
an unusual degree of exchange rate changes 
through the increased kurtosis of exchange rates 
measured in francs. due to the increased risk 
sensitivity highlighted by the crisis, compared 
to the Czech koruna, the forint showed more 
instances of extreme movement, most of which 
was extreme weakening. We see the fluctuating 
weakening of the strong pre-crisis comovement, 
while leading central banks tried their best to 
supply the market with FX liquidity. We must 
state, however, that although the colossal easing 
programmes of leading central banks managed 
to mitigate the pricing uncertainties of the 
currencies compared to the subprime and 
interim periods, it is still unclear what happens 
when these measures are discontinued. The 
temporary nature of the shock, caused by the 
sudden strengthening of the swiss franc against 
the euro, is an interesting finding: following 
the announcement of the exchange rate ceiling, 
market comovements have returned to previous 
levels. due to the historically strong correlation 
between the european currencies included in 
our analysis, the logical response to the crises 
should be the reduction in comovement 
(divergence) anyway, which we have proven. 
Nevertheless, the fundamental weakness of 
the forint was apparent: demonstrated by 
its weakening over the entire period, high 
kurtosis, higher number and more instances 
of extreme movement, and divergence. These 
characteristics were typically less prominent 
with the koruna, while in the case of key 
currencies, we found these to be incidental for 
the swiss franc and the euro. 
The forint showed extreme fluctuations, 
occurring with a frequency not seen before 
the crisis, against all three currencies used for 
foreign currency loans, while its historically 
strong comovement with european curren-
cies reduced temporarily. Considering that we 
saw similar developments with the koruna, 
we think that it would be advisable to imple-
ment a targeted programme in Central and 
eastern european countries, that are active in 
foreign currency lending, which would also 
include the asset and liability side consolida-
tion of the banks. during the management of 
such a programme, it would be very useful to 
transfer supervision competencies to the cen-
tral bank and also intensify community-level 
cooperation – following the example of swap 
agreements, used for half a decade to mitigate 
exchange rate volatility. 
 studies 
Public Finance Quarterly  2014/2 203
1 The publication of the present research findings 
was financed by the tÁMOP-4.1.1.C-12/1/
KONV-2012-0005 project, entitled: „Preparation 
of the concerned sectors for educational and R&d 
activities related to the Hungarian eLi project”. The 
project is supported by the european union and co-




4 Act No. 6/1993 Coll., on the Czech National Bank; 
Hungary: Act 124 in 1999; Poland: Act on Financial 






8 For example, the policy interest rate increase is 
connected to the prognosis of weaker price stability 






11 The list of central banks at times included the central 
















19 Normal distribution of capital market returns would 
be asymptotically expected by the law of large 
numbers – assuming that exchange rate changes 
were caused by chance. We can resolve the fat-tailed 
return problem with Lévy’s Pareto distribution 
assumption, that the sum of Pareto distributions 
measured over shorter time periods will also be a 
Pareto distribution, and with the increase in time 
intervals the distribution will approach the normal 
(Molnár, 2005, page 27). We should add, however, 
that in our current paper’s sample, which consists 
of 3,035 elements and spans 12 years, normal 
distribution of returns did not appear. 
20 The scale-free network’s hierarchical structure does 
not change neither as a function of time nor the size 
of the network. 
21 We used the World Bank’s narrowest definition, see: 
http://go.worldbank.org/JiBdRK3YC0.
22 during the Ansari–Bradley test, we compare two 
independent samples of different lengths, assuming 
Notes
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that they are from the same probability distribution, 
in contrast with the alternative hypothesis, according 
to which they only have similar medians and forms, 
but distributions with different variances. if H=0, 
the two samples are similar, whereas if H=1, they are 
significantly different.
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